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I. Introduction
There is a lengthy history of devolution of federal policy and programs to the states
through the use of grants-in-aid in general and block grants in particular. In the area of
agricultural policy, for example, programs for agricultural research and extension have,
since their origin, been jointly funded by a system of grants from the federal government
to the states. In recent years, the possible consequence of a major devolution of farm
policy and programs from the federal government to the states has received much
attention 1 .
Gunderson, et al (2004) explores the devolution of farm programs to the
states. The authors suggest that approximately one-third of USDA spending,
mainly associated with commodity and natural resource programs could be
devolved to the states through the use of block grants within broad policy aims
established by federal policy-makers. They present the case that devolution of
commodity and natural resource programs to the states would recognize the
differences between the states with respect to commodity production, production
costs, income distribution, and opportunities for off-farm employment. They note
that devolution is worth considering whenever it has the potential to make
program delivery more cost effective and to better satisfy state citizens’
preferences and goals. They also note that another potential benefit from
devolution can arise from the large differences in costs between local areas as
they address similar agricultural and natural resource issues.
The U.S. specialty crop industry has, in general, expressed a desire to
devolve specific specialty crop farm policy area and programs to the states. This
desire was exemplified by the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of
2001 which provided states with block grants to promote specialty crops. 2 The act
provided almost $160 million to all 50 states and Puerto Rico. The funds allocated
to the states were used to fund a variety of programs and the decision on what
1

There has been and continues to be a significant amount of debate about the relative merits of federal
block grants to the states (Feingold, et al; Waller; General Accounting Office, CATO). It is not the
objective of this paper to engage in that debate. Rather the intent is to provide some conceptual ideas
concerning the agricultural policy composition, funding, and design of specialty crop block grants should
they be included in future federal farm legislation. The history of federal grants-in-aid in general and block
grants in particular can be found in (Canada, 2002), and (Canada, 2003)
2
The term “specialty crop” has been defined a number of ways in both legislation and by government
agencies. The Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act of 2004 (PL 108-465) defines specialty crops as fresh
and dry fruit, vegetables, tree nuts, nursery and floriculture. This is the definition that will be used in this
paper.
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programs to fund was left almost entirely to the individual states with the provision
that the programs funded improve the competitiveness of U.S. specialty crops.
The specialty crop block grant program continued with the passage of the
Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act (SCCA) of 2004 (PL 108-465). The SCCA
block grants are to support programs in research, marketing, education, pest
and disease management, production, and food safety. The initial legislation
(HR 3242) called for an annual appropriation of $470 million in mandatory funds
from the Commodity Credit Fund to support the block grant program. The final
bill authorized the program subject to annual appropriations, and limited funding
to $44.5 million per year ($7 million was appropriated in FY 2006).
The desire to permanently incorporate specialty crop block grants into federal
farm legislation is receiving support from a number of specialty crop organizations,
their membership, and other stakeholders. 3 The U.S. specialty crop industry, in
general, would like to see many of the provisions of the SCCA incorporated into
the 2007 Farm Bill or other federal farm legislation. 4
The remainder of this paper explores some of the issues associated with
the devolution of federal farm policy through specialty crop block grants to the
states. The next section presents a brief history of block grants. This provides
the historical context for the use of block grants as a form of federal policy
devolution and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of block grant
programs.
The third section provides a discussion on some proposed goals for
specialty crop block grants. The proposed goals are interrelated with a
categorization of agricultural policy areas and programs that could be included in
specialty crop block grants. The policy areas and programs presented are meant
to be illustrative of those that could be included in specialty crop block grants
rather than a definitive list and are presented to stimulate discussion of the broad
issue relative to federal-state relations in agricultural policy.

3

A series of listening sessions and surveys were done in various regions of the U.S. among specialty crop
producers and specialty crop producer organizations. There was some variance in the response but for the
most part when asked “Is an active government role necessary to maintain or improve U.S. specialty crop
competitiveness?” the general response was yes. The results of the listening sessions and surveys can be
found at www.cissc.calpoly.edu/farmbill.
4
A recently introduced bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, HR 6193, The Equitable Agriculture
Today for a Healthy American Act” has as one of its main objectives is the establishment of a permanent
Specialty Crop State Block Grant Program (HR 6193 Title 1 Section 101).
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The forth section of the paper classifies the illustrative specialty crop
agricultural policy areas and programs into one of three funding classifications:
federal financed, state-federal financed and total state financed. The cost-share
rules used to classify the specialty crop policy areas and programs are
developed in Appendix A using a public finance model. The fifth section provides
a discussion on specialty crop block grant design and funding. It is followed by a
summary and conclusions section.

II. Historical Overview of Block Grants

The idea of devolution of federal policy and programs to the states predates
the Constitution. As early as 1785, Congress provided for grants of land to the
states under the Articles of Confederation. Devolution of federal policy to the states
can come in many forms, including grant-in-aids, loans, loan guarantees, insurance
and technical assistance. Two types of grants-in-aid, categorical grants, and block
grants often appear among the policy alternatives when devolution is being
considered. 5 Categorical grants have a narrow range of eligible activities permitting
funds to be used for only specific, narrowly defined purposes such as school breakfast
programs. Congress can distribute categorical grants competitively or by formula and
typically specifies the types of activities to which state or local governments can use
the federal funds. Block grants have a broad range of eligible activities and are
distributed to state and local governments on a formula basis to address broad
functional areas (Canada, 2002).
The first significant use of block grants as grant-in-aids was initiated under the
administration of President Lyndon Johnson. The first block grant (health) was enacted
in 1966. This was followed by enactment of the Partnership for Health block grant
program, approved in 1966, and the Safe Streets block grant program, created under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (OCCSSA) of 1968. Categorical grants
dominated federal grants-in-aid during Johnson and Nixon administrations. The
categorical grants were used to a fund a number of programs, including agricultural
research, housing, health initiatives, and environmental programs. In an attempt to
simplify the complexity and overlapping of the categorical grant programs, the Nixon
5

Categorical and block grants are conceptual classifications. It is sometimes difficult to classify a grant as
one type or other.
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administration proposed consolidating 129 different categorical grant programs into six
block grants. The proposal was rejected by Congress, but by the end of the Ford
administration and Congress had created three new large block grants. These block
grants were the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), the Social Services
Block Grant (SSBG), and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
program. The first two are still in operation. Funding for the third ended in 1982, but
other job training block grants have since been enacted.
The use of block grants as a means of consolidating categorical grants continued
in the Reagan administration. Congress, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981, consolidated 77 categorical grants into nine block grants accounting for
nearly 17 percent of federal funds sent to the states. The most recent expansion of
block grants occurred in 1996, when the 104th Congress approved the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, the welfare reform legislation
that replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children and related programs with the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant.
The use of block grants to devolve federal policy to the states has both its
supporters and critics. Supporters typically cite the following reasons for block grant
proposals. First, shifting from federal government management to block grants
administered at the state or local level reduces federal responsibility for the
establishment of priorities and oversight by giving states or localities more flexibility in
the use of funds.
A second argument for block grants is that state and local decision-making
about priorities and resource allocation is more responsive to state and local
preferences, needs, and costs than federal government decision-making. Thus, the case
for block grants is simply that in those areas of policy in which there is broad agreement
about the federal government goals and objectives relative to public policy, states can
determine the specific strategies employed to reach those goals and objectives based
on their knowledge of state and local conditions.
The third reason given for devolution of federal policy by block grants is that
block grants can be used to eliminate the categorical nature of funds, making it harder
for individual policy makers and advocates to take credit for services.
A forth reason given in support of the use of block grants is that block grants can
control spending. Although some block grants proposals include new or increased
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spending, proponents argue that over time there will be administrative and other
program savings that offset those increases.
Block grant critics have expressed a number of concerns relative to the merit of
block grant programs. Among these concerns are that the conditions placed on the
block grants may reduce or eliminate the flexibility of the block grant or that if states are
given flexibility they will use the flexibility to target programs that are politically popular
rather than those programs that exhibit the highest need or social benefits relative to
federal government policy goals and objectives.
Another concern is whether the states have the institutional and administrative
capacity in place when the block grant program begins to achieve any cost savings from
administrative efficiencies. If such capacity is missing, however, the state costs of
establishing such capacity may be greater than if the program had remained under
federal control. A final concern often mentioned is that the allocation of block grant
funding between the states is not equitable or that federal funding of block grants
diminishes over time, forcing the states to substitute state funding for federal funding to
maintain programs or force the states to eliminate public policy programs previously
funded by federal funds. 6 Several of these concerns will be discussed later in the paper
relative to specialty crop block grant design and funding allocations.
III. Specialty Crop Block Grant Proposed Goals and Illustrative Categorization of
Agricultural Policies and Programs
Specialty Crop Block Grant Goals
The stated federal policy goal of the first two specialty crop block grant
programs was to improve the competitiveness of U.S. specialty crop agriculture.
It is argued here, however, that competitiveness goal is part of a larger policy
objective, namely the long-run sustainability of the U.S. specialty crop industry. The
long-run sustainability of the U.S. specialty crop industry is defined to be a function of
its economic sustainability, environmental sustainability, and social sustainability. 7

6

A study of five Reagan block grants (Peterson and Nightingale, 1995) found that four of them decreased
in funding from 1986 – 1995, despite a 66% increase in total grants to state and local governments during
the same time period.
7
This goal is the one proposed in U.S. Specialty Crops: Opportunities and Challenges Report of the
Specialty Crop Committee of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, Education and Economics
Advisory Board April 30, 2006
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Economic sustainability is defined as the economic return to production that would
be required to keep productive assets (land, water, capital, labor, and
entrepreneurship) employed in the production of specialty crops. As such, economic
sustainability can be viewed as a reservation rate of return that would be dependent on
geographic location of production, specialty crop price, cost of production, and
economic scale and size of specialty crop producers (e.g., large commercial producer
or small part time or full time producers, etc). A major benefit of a federal block grant
program is to give the states some flexibility in addressing those issues.
The economic return to specialty crop production is primarily determined by the
production costs and demand for the specialty crop in question. 8 For example,
research programs that lead to new production technologies that increase output per
unit of input or allow substitution of a relatively less costly factor of production for a
more costly factor of production while at the time maintaining the same level of output
and quality can lead to reduced cost of production. Public policies and programs that
encourage greater domestic consumption of specialty crops or provide support for
developing and opening foreign markets have the potential to increase the demand for
specialty crops.
Environmental sustainability is the ability to address the environmental/resource
impacts that are either directly or indirectly related to agricultural production. Such
impacts include the prevention of soil erosion, preservation of farmland, elimination of
limitation of impacts of specialty crop production (chemicals, animal waste, dust, etc.)
from specialty crop farms to air and water resources. Additional issues can include
maintenance of open space, preservation of wildlife, humane treatment of animals, and
the use of agricultural crops and production by-products for energy production in an
effort to reduce the impact of agricultural wastes on environmental quality and reduce
U.S. energy dependence on foreign nations.
Social sustainability is the ability to address the social impacts of specialty crop
production. Such impacts include the adequacy of food availability and affordability,
nutrition education and assistance, adequate economic opportunities for minority

8

Although specialty crop producers receive indirect government support in terms of conservation
payments, market development and promotion subsidies, food assistance and government food purchase
programs, input cost subsidization (e.g. credit, water), and research, it is small relative to the budget cost of
crop price and income support payments paid to program crops such as wheat, rice, and corn.
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farmers, provision of minimum income levels for rural residents, and maintenance of
viable small scale specialty crop agriculture.
Though the long-run sustainability factors have been separated for discussion,
there are agricultural policies and programs that can impact more than one aspect of
sustainability. For example, a new production technology that lowers the cost of
production research and is more environmental friendly improves both economic and
environmental benefits. That is not to say that states should necessarily chose only
agricultural policies and programs that impact more than one sustainability factor. One
of the basic tenets of block grants programs is to allow states flexibility in the choice of
policy programs that best fit their particular circumstance to achieve a broadly stated
federal goal. Thus, it would be unlikely, given the differences in specialty crop
production mix, location of production, markets, input costs, and state and local policy
preferences, that each state would necessarily choose the same set of agricultural policy
areas and programs to include in their specialty crop block grant program or where
similar programs are selected that they would necessarily receive the same amount of
funding. However, states should be aware that those public policies and programs they
choose to fund under a block grant program can impact more than one sustainability
factor.
Illustrative Categorization of Specialty Crop Block Grants Policies and
Programs
Table 1 provides an illustrative categorization of potential agricultural policies and
program areas that could be considered for inclusion in state specialty crop block
grants. It is loosely based on the agricultural policy areas and programs that states
funded under the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 specialty
crop block grants to the states program. The categorization is not meant to provide
the definitive work in assessing those agricultural policy and program areas that could
be included in specialty crop block grants. Rather is it an attempt to relate potential
agricultural polices and programs to the long-run sustainability factors 9 .
There are agricultural policies that were purposely left off the illustrative
categorization. Public policies that have as a goal redistribution of income such as
9

As was mentioned in footnote 1 the intent of this paper is to provide come conceptual ideas concerning
the agricultural policy composition, funding and design of specialty crop blocks should they be
incorporated in federal farm legislation rather than the merits of such a block grant program. The authors
are unaware of any empirical studies where the benefits of the specialty crop block programs developed by
individual states under the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 specialty crop block
grant program have been quantified.
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food stamps (Warner 2001) or policy areas and programs where there are potential
spillovers between the states such as interstate food safety issues or interstate
environmental issues are best maintained at the federal level. Similarly, traditional
program crop income support programs and the associated program areas are not
considered because, in general, specialty crop producers and specialty crop producer
organizations do not appear to favor such programs. 10
Table 1 illustrates three broad agricultural policy areas that could be considered
for inclusion into a state specialty crop block grant program. Listed under each policy
area is a specific policy program. Each policy program is related to one or more of the
long-run sustainability goals. The three policy areas are discussed below.

Environment Programs
There are a number of federal environmental policy programs in agriculture.
These programs can be broadly classified as land retirement or working land
programs. Working land program are programs are probably best suited to address the
wide range of environmental issues faced the specialty crop industry. 11 The federal
working land programs include the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP),
Ground and Surface Water Program, Klamath Basin Program, Wildlife Habitat
Incentive Program, and Conservation Security Program.
Environmental working land programs can assist specialty crop producers by
providing them additional revenue for the provision of environmental goods and
services or reducing their cost of production by providing cost-share programs to assist
specialty crop producers in meeting specific environmental standards such as air, and
water quality standards. The use of working lands programs by specialty crop
producers also demonstrates their willingness to address the public demand for
environmental goods and services or concerns that the public may have about the
direct or indirectly impact that specialty crop production may be having on
10

A general conclusion that can be drawn from the listening sessions and surveys mentioned in an early
footnote is that specialty crop producers and specialty crop producer organization are not generally in favor
of program crop price and income support programs. At the same time, it should be noted that this policy
position is not unanimous among the participants in the specialty crop industry. The dry bean industry, for
example, prefers a direct payment program over a block grant program if the restriction on the planting of
fruits and vegetables is eliminated (Brown).
11
Schweikhardt (2006) compares and contrasts land retirement programs and working land programs
relative to the specialty crop industry. He finds that working land environmental programs that address a
wide range of environmental problems on land that is active in agricultural production is probably best
suited to address the conservation needs of the specialty crop industry.
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environmental quality. These goods and services include providing wildlife or species
habitat, enhancing biodiversity, and preserving open space, or utilizing cover crops that
help sequester carbon, filter water and clean the air. Cost-sharing programs can assist
specialty crop producers in adopting specialty crop production technologies that protect
soils from erosion, improve soil quality, and reduce ground and surface water
contamination.

Table 1. Illustrative Categorization of Specialty Crop Block Grant Policy Areas and Programs
Long-Run Sustainability Factor
Agricultural

Programs

Economic

Environmental

Working Land

X

X

Agro-Tourism

X

X

Crop Product

X

Social

Policy
Environment

Programs
Marketing

X

Branding and
Promotion
Direct Marketing

X

X

Farm-To-School

X

X

Organic Product

X

X

X

Promotion
State-Grown

X

Promotion
Trade Promotion

X

and Development
Research and

Agricultural

X

X

Extension

Sustainability

Education

Biofuels

X

X

Crop Production

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Technologies
Economic

X

Research
Extension
Education
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Table 1. Illustrative Categorization of Specialty Crop Block Grant Policy Areas and Programs
Cont.)
Long-Run Sustainability Goals
Agricultural

Programs

Economic

Environmental

Social

Research and

Food Processing

X

X

Extension

Value-Added

Education

Food Safety

X

X

Harvest Technology

X

Marketing

X

Policy

X

Research
Organic Production

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Technology
Pest Prevention,
Detection and
Eradication
Waste Management

Each program has some form of state administrative involvement in determining
which projects receive funding. Each of the working lands programs has the potential
to contribute to the specialty crop industry’s economic and environmental sustainability
goals. Specialty crop industry concerns center around level of appropriated funding for
these programs and to some extent the program emphasis. The likelihood of these
programs being devolved to the states is unknown. However, partial devolution through
specialty crop block grants would allow the states greater flexibility in addressing
specific state and local specialty crop environmental issues. The degree of devolution
is most likely dependent on the whether state flexibility in addressing the specific
environmental issues embodied in the various working land programs can be done
more effectively at the state level and would better satisfy state citizens’
preferences and goals.

Marketing Programs
Although there is no specific farm bill title or federal agricultural policy that
addresses specialty crop marketing issues there are a number of marketing programs
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that have been funded by state governments, specialty crop boards and commissions
and, in some instances, federal funds to promote specific state specialty crops and
value-added products. Most of the promotion is directed at potentially increasing the
demand for a specific state’s specialty crops. The prevailing idea is that if a specific
state can increase the demand for its specialty crops and value-added products, then
that demand increase will contribute to the economic sustainability of its specialty crop
industry. The popularity of this type of state specialty crop promotion activity is evident
from the fact that slightly over 50% of the $153 million allocated to the states under
Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 specialty crop block grant
program was spend on marketing (National Association of State Departments of
Agriculture).
Three of the marketing programs listed above -- agro-tourism, farm-to-school,
and organic marketing -- are shown to contribute to economic, environmental, and
social sustainability. Agro-tourism provides an economic opportunity for small and
medium sized specialty crop producers to increase their income from value-added
activities. It provides a recreational activity that can be used to educate the public and
provide a platform to introduce potential consumers to the nutritional benefits of
consuming fruits and vegetables. This program contributes to societal sustainability by
providing the public the opportunity to visit and view specialty crop farms to see first
hand the contributions that specialty crop agriculture make to the environment.
Farm-to-school programs can be viewed as a long-run investment to increasing
demand for many specialty crop products by educating school age children and young
adults on the taste and nutrition benefit of fresh fruit and vegetables. To the extent this
program can influence food tastes and preferences of school aged children and young
adults the more likely it is that they will carry those tastes and preferences into the
future when they are making their food purchases. The farm-to-school program can
also be used to illustrate the environmental goods provided by specialty crop
production. Additionally, the nutrition education provided to school aged children and
young adults which could result in a healthier populace in the future and thus contribute
to the social sustainability of the industry.
Organic marketing programs offers specialty crop producers the opportunity to
develop and market products that can command a price premium in food markets.
Organic farming systems rely on ecologically-based practices, such as cultural and
biological pest management, and virtually exclude the use of synthetic chemicals in
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crop production. Organic farming contributes to societal sustainability in several ways.
It is perceived a providing safe nutritious food products and it is seen to provide a way
to maintain economic viable small scale agriculture.
The remainder of the marketing programs listed in Table 1, with the exception of
direct marketing programs, contributes to the economic sustainability of specialty crop
producers primarily through promotion and branding programs. Direct marketing can
be can be an important source of revenue for small and medium sized specialty crop
producers. For example, approximately 19,000 farmers reported selling their produce
only at farmers markets Eighty-two percent of farmers markets were self-sustaining,
meaning market income was sufficient to pay for all costs associated with the operation
of the market. In addition, 58 percent of markets participated in some local, state or
national nutrition program, and 25 percent of farmers markets aided in distributing food
and food products to needy families (USDA, 2005). The latter two statistics illustrate
the social sustainability characteristic of direct marketing.

Research and Extension Education Programs
The role of public policy and public funding for agricultural research and
extension education is receiving increasing scrutiny and review as federal and state
governments evaluate their spending priorities relative to limited budgets and
changing market and population dynamics. The agricultural research and extension
education system is being required by society and public-policy officials to address
not only agricultural productivity and product innovation issues that affect food cost
and market competitiveness issues but also concerns regarding nutrition and health,
food safety and quality, convenience and variety, the environment, and societal
issues such a worker safety, economic opportunity for small and minority producers,
and food assistance. A detailed review of each research and extension education
program presented in Table 1 is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, a more
general discussion of the economic, environmental, and societal sustainability issues
relative to specialty crop research and extension education programs will be
presented.
A review of Table 1 indicates that all of the research and education programs
listed contribute to at least two of the sustainability goals, and programs for
agricultural sustainability, economic research and extension education, and organics
contribute to all three goals. Those research and extension education programs that
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contribute to achieving some combination of economic, environmental, and social
sustainability goals do so by assisting the specialty crop industry in meeting
changing consumer food demand and by improving existing or developing new crop
production and pest detection and control technologies that maintain or improve US
specialty crop competitiveness and provide society with environmental and social
benefits.
Research and extension education programs that assist the specialty crop in
meeting changing consumer demand can be categorized as those that provide
support in responding to consumer demand for more varied, convenient products
with desirable sensory attributes such as taste and appearance. It could be argued
that the greater burden for meeting consumer demand for varied, convenient
products with desirable sensory attributes lies with the specialty crop industry since
the likely benefits would be directed to specific specialty crop producers (e.g. larger
tastier oranges, perishable vegetable with longer shelf life, etc). However, there is a
supportive role for research and extension education in the areas of market
research, development of new crop cultivars and specialty crop food products to
meet changing consumer food product tastes. For example, development of
differentiated products that have unique design or qualitative characteristics, in
contrast to undifferentiated crops, can often be sold at higher prices than other
products. Production of these niche items presents a growing opportunity for small
and medium size farmers to satisfy changing customer tastes and increase the
profitability of their goods.
The second general class of crop and specialty crop product research and
extension education programs would be those that provide a basis for responding to
other consumer preferences that the market may undervalue such as consumer
demand for perceived environmentally benign goods, nonsensory attributes of food
products such as such as nutrition and safety, or attributes that meet ethical or
religious standards. These food attributes are more difficult for consumers to
identify and thus not provide the market signals that would drive specialty crop
producers toward new product development that meets those demands.
Economic research and extension education programs can provide economic
information, contribute to technological change (production and management
innovations, product introduction and marketing methods, and research and
development management tools) and contribute to public policy (institutional
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innovations, policy analysis tools, and policy impact assessment) that can assist
specialty crop producers in achieving economic, environmental, and social
sustainability. Economic research is also useful for identifying barriers and
opportunities relative to the long-run sustainability of the U.S. specialty crop industry.
There is relative little private incentive for investment in economic research and
extension education, thus providing a strong justification for public investment.
Research and extension education programs in the development and
adoption of new or improved specialty crop production technologies that result in
achieving higher crop production productivity, lower costs of production, and provide
for improved pest prevention, detection, and eradication can have significant impact
on long-run specialty crop economic sustainability. These research and extension
education programs can also be directed at reducing or eliminating the negative
impact of existing specialty crop production technologies on the environment thus
reducing social costs of production. For example, the development of chemical
intensive specialty crop production practices significantly increased production
productivity. However, this expansion had negative impacts on society by affecting
farm worker health, water quality, and wildlife habitat. Consumers appear to have
become increasingly concerned about these impacts in recent years. National polls
show most consumers express some form of concern about exposure to chemical
used in producing, storing and processing food products. New technologies that can
reduce these environmental impacts while addressing social concerns will assist
specialty crop producers in moving toward the environment and social sustainability
goals especially if they also reduce economic costs.

IV. Funding Classifications for Illustrative Specialty Crop Policy and Programs

There are two objectives to this section of the paper. The first is to develop a
cost-share allocation framework for specialty crop programs based on the public finance
allocation rules developed in Appendix A. Three cost-share allocations are presented:
federal financing; federal-state financing, and state financing. The second objective is to
stimulate discussion on the appropriate federal-state funding share for each program
listed on Table 1. The general rule followed in determining federal-state cost share
funding type is that the greater the spillover benefit from any given program from a
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specific state to other states, the greater the federal cost share should be, and the less
the spillover benefits the less the federal cost share should be. There is naturally a
degree of arbitrariness to the choice of cost-share allocation assigned to each specialty
crop policy area program. Rationales for the choices are presented, and while it is likely
there will not be agreement on cost-share type assigned to each of the specialty crop
policy area program, the framework can be used to stimulate deliberation about the
appropriate cost-share allocation. That discussion will center, in part, on the magnitude
of direct and spillover benefits of the various specially crop policy programs that have
been presented.
It is argued that public finance funding rules would allow for the most
economically efficient allocation of federal and state funds. This would appear to be in
line with a primary rational for devolving federal government policy (and funds) to the
states through the use of specialty crop state block grants which is to allow the states
some latitude in achieving federal government policy goals more efficiently and
effectively at a local level than could be achieved at a federal level. However, as noted
in the second section of the paper, critics of block grants often argue that when states
are given the flexibility associated with block grants they will use that flexibility to target
programs that are politically popular rather than those that exhibit the highest need or
social benefits relative to the stated federal policy goals and objectives. That is political
considerations can supersede economic efficiency considerations in the block grant
funding allocation decisions.
The cost-share finance allocations are shown in Table 2. There is no attempt to
provide percentage allocations where federal-state funding is suggested as the
appropriate cost-share funding type, nor will any attempt rank the various programs
relative to spillover benefits that they may produce. That is best left to the individual
states and federal government to determine, but that determination should be based, at
least in part, on the extent to which the states can demonstrate that benefit spillovers
will occur from the proposed uses of the specialty crop block grant funds.
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Table 2. U.S Specialty Crop Block Grant Funding
Funding Type
Agricultural

Programs

Policy
Environmental

Federal

State-Federal

Financed

Financed

Working Land

State Financed

X

Programs
Marketing

Agro-Tourism

X

Crop Product

X

Branding and
Promotion
Direct

X

Marketing
Farm-to-School

X

Organics

X

Product
Promotion
State-Grown

X

Promotion
Trade

X

Promotion and
Development
Agricultural

Programs

Policy
Research and

Agricultural

Extension

Sustainability

Federal

Federal-State

Funding

Funding

State Funding

X

Education
Biofuels

X

Crop

X

Production
Technologies
Economic

X

Research
Extension

X

Education
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Table 2. U.S Specialty Crop Block Grant Funding (Cont.)
Funding Type
Agricultural

Programs

Policy

Federal

Federal-State

Funding

Funding

Food Processing

State Funding

X

Value-Added
Food Safety
Harvest Technology

X
X

Marketing

X

Research
Organic Production

X

Technology
Pest Prevention,

X

Detection and
Eradication
Waste Management

X

Environmental Programs
As was noted in section III environmental working land programs can assist
specialty crop producers by providing them additional revenue for the provision of
environmental goods and services or reducing their cost of production by providing
cost-share programs to assist specialty crop producers in meeting specific
environmental standards such as air, and water quality standards. These programs
easily fall under the federal-state cost share funding type category since they already
have some degree of state administrative involvement.
The percent of federal-state cost share would depend on the amount of spillover
benefit that occurs due to these programs. The case can be made that to the extent
that cleaner air and water in a state primarily benefit that state’s citizens relative to its
spillover benefits to other states the more the state should bear the costs of those
programs. However, it is also a valid argument to note that the provision of open
space, farmland preservation, and provision of wildlife habitat in a specific state can
have spillover benefits to the rest of the states. For example, a national goal is the
protection of endangered species. Thus, to the extent a state has a relatively large
proportion of endangered species within its boundaries the more spillover benefit it is
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providing to the rest of the nation given that its working land programs are providing
such a protection.
This example provides at least some framework for determining percentage
allocations. The more a state provides for achievement of a national goal (preservation
of farmland, open space, wildlife habitat, etc) the greater the federal contribution should
be in the cost-share percentage.

Marketing Programs
Marketing programs fall under two different funding types, federal-state cost share
and state funded. The state funded marketing program include specialty crop branding
and promotion programs and state-grown promotion programs. There is a relatively
long history of state-legislated commodity marketing orders. 12 In the 1980’s many
states launched the programs to collectively promote all products produced within the
states under a single state brand. Examples included Jersey Fresh and Something
Special from Wisconsin. This was followed in the 2000’s with programs such as Buy
California Grown and A+ Alabama. Currently 43 states have state branding
programs. 13 The degree to which these programs have been successful is mixed. 14 An
economic argument ( Means, 1987) can be made that these types of programs have
little likelihood of success since for the most part agricultural products are inherently
difficult to differentiate and even where evidence exists that crop promotion programs
and state grown programs can result in some degree of product differentiation (Hayes,
Lence, and Stoppa, 2003) it is difficult to argue that specific crop promotion programs
(e.g., Washington apples) or state-brand programs (e.g., Buy California Grown) would
have significant spillover benefits to other states. It is much more likely that most of the
benefits that would accrue from engaging in these types of promotional activities would
accrue to the given state’s specialty crop industry or to a specific specialty crop
industry located within a state 15 .

12

Forker and Ward (1993) counted as many as 261 state legislated marketing orders in 1989.
See Patterson (2006) for a tabular description of states, program name, year established, and budget.
14
Patterson et al., (1999) showed little evidence of the Arizona Grown program increased product sales
while Govindasamy et al. (2003) argued that the Jersey Fresh program provided $32 in return for fruit and
vegetable growers for each dollar invested.
15
It might be argued that specific commodity and/or state promotion programs could increase aggregate
consumer demand for a product or set of products; however, there would appear to be a lack of empirical
evidence to support that argument.
13
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Trade promotion and development programs potentially open up new foreign
market and/or expand existing foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products. These
programs have the same product differentiation issues associated with them as crop
product branding and promotion programs and state-grown promotion programs have.
If a given state promotes its products to a specific foreign market and another state
promotes very similar products to the same foreign market using federal funds then the
question arises to whether there is a spillover benefit. The lack of a spillover effect of a
state promoting its specially crop products in competition with other states is
complicated by federal programs that support the development and promotion of U.S.
agricultural products and have various programs to support individual industries in the
promotion of their specific programs to foreign markets.
Thus it is likely that most if not the entire benefit of these types of promotional
programs would be retained in the individual state and/or by specific industries within a
state and unless a substantive argument can be made otherwise it would appear
appropriate for these state specific trade promotion programs to be funded from mostly
if not entirely by state funds.
The reminder of the marketing programs would seem to qualify for some type of
federal-state funding match. Agro-tourism, direct marketing and organics product
promotion programs can be useful in providing small and medium sized specialty crop
producers will market outlets and the opportunity to increase their farm revenues. All
of these programs have some history of receiving federal support through a variety of
federal programs. The primary rationale for federal support of these programs is the
maintenance of the small to medium sized family farms, preservation of open space,
and long-run agricultural sustainability. If these continue to be federal goals for the
agricultural sector, then it would seem appropriate to provide federal funding for them
in form of specialty crop block grants so that the states can have the flexibility to
develop specific programs in these areas that best fit their local conditions.
Farm-to-School programs can be used to educate children on the health benefits
associated with the consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables. The 2001 report The
Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Prevent Overweight and Obesity notes that, left
unabated, overweight and obesity may soon cause as much preventable disease and
death as smoking. Further, their associated health problems have substantial
economic consequences for the U.S. health care system. The increasing prevalence of
overweight and obesity is associated with both direct and indirect costs. The costs
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associated with obesity, totaling $117 billion in 2000, are due to type 2 diabetes,
coronary heart disease, and hypertension. Thus federal funding of programs like the
farm-to-school program can have substantial spillover benefits if they result in
reductions in diet related diseases.

Research and Extension Education Programs
Federal funding of agricultural research and extension education programs has a
long history. In 1862, Congress passed the Morrill Land Grant College Act, which gave
states and U.S. territories land that they could sell to develop colleges that would offer
practical instruction in agriculture and mechanical arts. Studies have shown that past
public investment in agricultural research resulted in large economic benefits of
between 30% to 60% annual rate of return. 16 This high rate of return implies that
additional dollars for agricultural research would result in substantial increases in
economic growth.
Government supports research and extension education programs in agriculture
because of the” public nature” of knowledge 17 . The public nature of research and
extension education programs results in benefits that cannot be captured (or captured
to a very limited extent) by a single entity. Those benefits that are not captured
become spillover benefits. Examples of spillover benefits from agricultural research
and extension education programs include states copying technological innovations
that can reduce production costs, reduce environmental damage for specialty crop
production, increase yields, reduce crop susceptibility to pests, improve pest
prevention, detection and eradication technologies, adopting or improving upon new
plant cultivars or copying value-added products that were the result of agricultural
research in other states. Additionally, agricultural research can provide benefits to
consumers from lower priced products, improved products, and greater consumer
product choices and provide economic information and extension education to

16

Alston, et al in a summary of 289 studies of the returns to agricultural research and education (extension)
since 1958, including 164 studies during the 1990 – 1998 time period found returns to agricultural research
to be very high. A recent USDA study Agricultural Research and Development: Public and Private
Investments under Alternative Markets and Institutions (1996) concluded that after adjusting for a number
of possible errors that the rate of return was likely to around 35%. Similar studies on the extension
education show rates of return in the 20% range (Huffman and Everson, 1993)
17
Knowledge has two characteristics of a public good. The first is that the use of the knowledge does not
reduce the amount available to others and the second is that others cannot be prevented from using the
knowledge once it becomes available.
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agricultural producers, specialty crop stakeholders, and government officials that
allows for more informed decision-making on their part. 18
A basic question that must be addressed before discussing the funding type for
the agricultural research programs and extension education areas in table 2 is what
type of agricultural research should be devolved to the states and what type is best left
to the federal government to pursue? Research programs can be defined as basic or
applied. The National Science Foundation (NSF) defines basic research as research
conducted to gain a more complete understanding of the subject under study without a
specific application in mind. The NSF defines applied research as research aimed at
gaining knowledge to meet a specific and recognized need. 19 It is argued here that the
basic research is best left in the hands of universities and public research agencies
and specific applied research programs could be devolved to the states.
There are two rationales for this argument. First, there is a long history of basic
agricultural research conducted by USDA and the Land Grant universities. USDA
conducts research at the Agricultural Research Service, Economic Research Service,
and Forest Service and it provided extramural funding since the latter-half of the 19th
century to the Land Grant universities to do basic research. It is not likely that the states
should or would want to duplicate these research efforts nor is it likely that any of the
benefits that accrue to block grants programs could be achieved if these basic research
programs were to be devolved to the states. The rationale for devolving selected
applied research programs to the states rests on one of the basic premises for
devolution of federal policy and funding to the states that state and local decision-making
about priorities and resource allocation is more responsive to state and local
preferences, needs, and costs than federal decision-making. Thus, the case for
devolution of selected applied research programs to the states via specialty crop block
grants is that the states based on their knowledge of state and local conditions should be
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Although not discussed here two important questions need to be answered in determining the value of
public financed research and extension education: First, what is the likelihood of success of any given
research or extension education project? Second, is the research or extension education project is
successful, what is its value to society?
19
Basic research would include research in the general sciences (e.g. genetics, biology, zoology) and pretechnical sciences (e.g. soil chemistry, plant physiology, nutrition, applied economics). Applied research
concentrates on technology invention such as plant and animal breeding, horticulture, irrigation methods,
and farm management among others. It should be noted that NSF characterization of basic and applied
research is not universally accepted since what may be basic research to one researcher may be applied
research to another.
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in a better position than the federal government to determine what selected applied
research best fits their needs.
All of the agricultural research program areas and extension education shown in
Table 2 have the potential to provided spillover benefits from one state to the others.
Three of the research and extension education program areas are indicated as federal
funding type programs. Each of these areas can have major spillover benefits
associated with each and each supports federal policy goals. Biofuels have the
potential to be an important source of renewable energy, thus permitting the U.S. to
reduce its reliance on foreign energy resources which is a stated national goal. State
research in this area that leads to greater utilization of specialty crop biofuels
(production residues, cannery wastes, etc) can easily be adopted by other states.
Research that results in improved specialty crop production technologies such as
higher productivity, more sustainable specialty crop production practices, and
increasing the number of disease resistant specialty crop cultivars to name can have
significant spillover benefits.
Improvements in specialty crop harvest technologies might include labor-saving
technologies, increased food safety, and more environmentally benign harvest
technologies. There are spillover benefits between the various specialty crop states as
improvements in specialty crop harvest technologies are made. The benefits could
include less reliance on foreign workers for harvest, lower harvest costs, increased
food safety, and less environment degradation. Each of these benefits assists the
federal government in achieving some national policy objective: immigration reform,
greater economic sustainability for the U.S. specialty crop industry, a safer food supply,
and a cleaner environment.
Seven research and extension education programs are designated as federalstate funding types: agricultural sustainability, economic research, extension education,
food processing value-added, food safety, organic production technology, and pest
prevention, detection, and eradication. As was mentioned earlier no attempt is made
to provide a numerical percentage of federal versus state funding for those programs
where joint funding is the designated funding type. This is especially true for these
seven programs. Although, a case can be made that spillover benefits will occur from
the research and extension education programs in these seven program areas, it is
less clear what percent of the research and extension education benefits would accrue
directly to a specific state and what percentage would spillover between states. The
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federal-state funding allocation will most likely have to be determined on a state by
state program by program negotiation between the states and the federal government.
Two research areas are designated a state funding types. The benefits from
marketing research studies and waste management projects are most likely to accrue
mostly, if not entirely, to a specific state or specific specialty crop industry within a
state. As was noted earlier unless a substantive argument can be made otherwise it
would appear that funding for these types of programs come from state funds.
This section has provided an illustrative funding classification for each of the
program areas listed in Table 2. The program areas are classified by funding type, i.e.,
federal funding, joint funding by the federal and state governments, or state funding. It
should be emphasized that the funding type selected for each program area is based
on the public finance funding allocation rules developed in Section III. The basic
decision rule used was the degree to which benefits from these programs was thought
spillover from state to the next. This suggests that a degree of arbitrariness is
imbedded in the how the funding allocations were determined; however, the intent of
this section was not to provide a definitive set of funding type allocations. Rather, the
intent was to provide a funding type allocation framework and to stimulate discussion
on what the appropriate federal-state funding share should be given if specialty crop
block grants become a permanent component of federal farm legislation.

V. Block Grant Design Concepts and Funding issues

Earlier in the paper, a number of concerns relative to block grants were
presented. These concerns include: (1) states using block grant funds to fund programs
that are politically popular rather than those that exhibit the highest needs or benefits
relative to the stated federal goals and objectives; (2) that the conditions placed on the
block grants may reduce or eliminate the flexibility of the block grant; (3) that all states
may not have the institutional or administrative support to manage a block grant
program; and (4) the issue of determining the allocation of funding between the federal
government and states and the maintenance of federal funding of specialty crop block
grants over time.
Canada (2001) provides concepts for legislative design and oversight relative to
federal grants to the states. Several of the concepts identified are relevant to the
design of a specialty crop block grant program. The relevant concepts include
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conditioning of grants, matching requirements; formulas for allocating funds,
intergovernmental review, and congressional oversight. The matching requirement
concept is addressed in the Funding Classification for Illustrative Specialty Crop Policy
and Programs section of the paper. The discussion below will concentrate on
conditioning of grants and formula allocation of specialty crop block grant funding since
these are the concepts that best address the concerns described in the second section
of the paper.
The conditioning of federal funds can be used to address points 1 and 2 above.
The term “conditioning” refers to requirements the federal government places on
recipients of grant funds. Two types of conditioning are discussed by Canada -general requirements and crossover sanctions. General requirements apply to almost
every federal assistance program and focus on the manner in which recipients use
federal funds. They address such issues as financial accountability, nondiscrimination, and environmental protection. Crossover sanctions impose financial
sanctions in one functional area to influence state policy in another area. An example
of a crossover sanction would be the withdrawal of federal highway funds if a state
does not meet certain air quality standards.
The use of conditioning mechanisms to address points 1 and 2 for specialty crop
block grants would require the federal government to designate the goals and
objectives for the grant program, while providing states the flexibility to choose specific
policy programs that best fit their particular circumstance to achieve the federal goals
and objectives. Thus, if the conditioning is designed properly, it could reduce the
public and political pressure on the state agency administering the specialty crop block
grant to develop state programs that may be political popular but do not exhibit the
highest needs or benefits relative to the federal goals and objectives. At the same
time, proper design can still provide the states with the flexibility associated with a
block grant program.
Concerns have been expressed that some states may not have the have the
institutional or administrative support and/or manage a specialty crop block grant
program. 20 These concerns range from states being unable to identify block grant
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It has been pointed out by critics of specialty crop block grants that some states were not as effective as
others in administering projects that had identifiable benefits in the specialty crop block grant program that
was authorized in the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 (House Committee on
Agriculture, Subcommittee on Livestock and Horticulture Hearing, November 5, 2003, Serial No. 108-20,
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benefits to the duplication or overlap between state and federal programs, to the
overlap between state programs, to the costs of administering block grant programs.
These concerns could be addressed by conditioning mechanisms and by the states
providing evidence that they do have the institutional and administrative capabilities
and capacities to manage a specialty crop block grant program. The latter could be a
requirement for applying for a specialty crop block grant.
All block grant programs use formulas to determine the grant amounts available to
recipients. Congress determines the formulas or the formula variables that are used to
distribute the funds. The selection of the formula or formula variables can spark much
debate in Congress and among recipients. There are a number of allocation principles
that can be adopted by Congress. These include Fair Share, Need for Services, Fiscal
Equalization, Actual Amount of Costs, and Targeting.
Fair Share allocations can be allocations based on some proportion of an
economic measure or physical measure such as farm proceeds or acreage. Need for
Services bases the allocation on need. The need is typically based on some sub-group
of the target population such as small producers or organic producers. Fiscal
Equalization allocations are based on the differing ability of state (or localities)
governments to finance policy programs thus those deemed less fiscally able would
receive higher allocations. Actual Amount of Costs allocations are based on the fact
that some states (or localities) face higher costs than other states in providing
comparable public services thus requiring more federal assistance. Targeting
allocations concentrates funding to a select group of recipients such as those in some
geographical regions such as drought regions of the U.S. A case could be made that
any of these allocation methods could be used to allocate specialty crop block grant
funds among the states. The allocation examples presented here are based on the
Fair Share principle. It was chosen since this was the allocation principle in allocating
funds to the states in the specialty crop block grant program that was authorized in the
Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001.
Two types of Fair Share allocations are shown as examples. Table 3 shows the
allocations that would occur if straight percentage of state farm receipts were used as
the basis for the specialty crop funding allocations. Farm receipts are based on five
different definitions of specialty crops.
Review of Domestic Policies Affecting the Specialty Crop Industry. Available at
[http://gpo.gov/congress/house]
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Table 3. Specialty Crop Block Grant Funding
Straight Percentage Average Farm Receipts 2003 - 2005
$1.00

Fruits, Nuts,
Vegetables,
Fruit, Nuts,
Greenhouse/
Vegetables &
Greenhouse/ All Specialty Nursery &
Crops
Aquaculture
Nursery
California
Colorado
Florida
Iowa
Michigan
Nebraska
New York
Texas
Washington

$0.41
$0.01
$0.10
$0.00
$0.03
$0.00
$0.02
$0.04
$0.06

$0.37
$0.02
$0.09
$0.01
$0.03
$0.01
$0.02
$0.05
$0.07

$0.40
$0.01
$0.10
$0.00
$0.03
$0.00
$0.02
$0.04
$0.06

Fruits, Nuts,
Vegetables,
Greenhouse/ All Specialty
Nursery &
Crops &
Livestock and
Livestock
Products
and Products

$0.17
$0.03
$0.04
$0.04
$0.02
$0.04
$0.02
$0.08
$0.03

$0.17
$0.03
$0.04
$0.04
$0.02
$0.04
$0.02
$0.08
$0.03

Table 3 shows the allocation that would exist for every $1.00 of specialty crop
block grant funding for nine states. The nine states were chosen to show the allocation
outcomes based on different specialty crop definitions. California would receive $0.41
of every dollar allocated to specialty crop block grants if the specialty crop definition is
defined to include fruits, nuts, vegetables, and greenhouse/nursery products.
California’s allocation would decrease to $0.17 of every dollar, however, under the
most inclusive definition of all specialty crop (fruits, nuts, vegetables,
greenhouse/nursery, non-program grains, hay, other non-program crops, and livestock
and products. In contrast, Iowa’s specialty block grant allocation would increase from
almost zero ($0.005 per $1.00) to $0.04 per $1.00 as the definition becomes more
inclusive.
Table 4 shows the allocations that would exist for the same states and same
specialty crop definitions if every state received a base amount plus some percentage
of farm receipts. This is similar to the allocation principle adopted for the distribution of
specialty crop block grant funds authorized under the Emergency Agricultural
Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001.
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Table 4. Specialty Crop Block Grant Funding Base Plus Percentage Average FarmReceipts 2003- 2005
Base 15%of Total Allocation
$1.00
Fruits, Nuts,
Fruits, Nuts, Vegetables,
Vegetables, Greenhouse/ All Specialty
Fruit, Nuts,
Nursery &
Crops &
Greenhouse/
Vegetables &
Greenhouse/ All Specialty Nursery & Livestock and Livestock
Products and Products
Aquaculture
Nursery
Crops

California
Colorado
Florida
Iowa
Michigan
Nebraska
New York
Texas
Washington

$0.353
$0.013
$0.091
$0.005
$0.026
$0.005
$0.021
$0.037
$0.054

$0.320
$0.016
$0.079
$0.008
$0.027
$0.008
$0.020
$0.042
$0.059

$0.347
$0.013
$0.090
$0.005
$0.025
$0.005
$0.021
$0.037
$0.053

$0.146
$0.026
$0.036
$0.040
$0.018
$0.041
$0.019
$0.067
$0.026

$0.144
$0.026
$0.034
$0.039
$0.019
$0.040
$0.019
$0.067
$0.029

Table 4 shows the specialty crop funding allocations that would occur if Congress
divided 15% of the specialty crop block grant funding equally across the states and
Puerto Rico. Each state would receive approximately $0.0029 of each dollar allocated
and Puerto Rico would receive $0.0058 of each dollar allocated. 21 The remaining funds
are allocated based on the percent of average farm receipts of the individual states. The
allocation is table 4 show that with a base plus percentage allocation the amount funded
to each of the predominantly specialty crop states is less than that under a straight
percentage allocation, while those states that are predominantly program grain and live
stock product states tend to receive larger allocations across all specialty crop
definitions.
The two examples provided give an indication of the sensitivity of funding
allocations based on (a) the formula and (b) the definition of specialty crops upon which
the allocation is based. The choice of formula and of specialty crop definition will be a
political decision, but the formula and crop definition chosen should reflect the goals and
objectives of a specialty crop block grant program.
21

The $0.0029 is obtained by dividing the $0.15 by 52. The specialty crop block grants authorized under
the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act (EAAC) of 2001 allocated $500,000 to each state as a base and
allocated $1,000,000 to Puerto Rico but Puerto Rico did not receive a percentage share of the remaining
funds that were allocated to the states thus the percentage allocation are based on the 50 state farm receipts
as a percentage of U.S. farm receipts for each of the five specialty crop definitions.
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The other funding issue is the maintenance of federal funding for a specialty crop
block program over time. An essential issue is the question of whether the specialty
crop block grant program should be supported with mandatory or discretionary funds.
An argument in favor of mandatory funding is that the economic importance to the
specialty crop industry to the U.S. farm sector deserves greater equity with the major
program crops in terms of the federal government’s investment in its economic wellbeing. This fits well with the proposed goal of specialty crop block grant program, which
is to improve the long-run sustainability of the U.S. specialty crop industry. Specialty
crop industry organizations and representatives are generally in favor of programs that
increase the demand and competitiveness of specialty crops in the U.S. and globally but
do not distort domestic production of international markets. Several of the public policy
programs discussed in the illustrative categorization section of the paper speak to that
proposition.
Current high deficit levels, however, pose a problem for increasing mandatory
funding for agriculture without an offsetting reduction in commodity program support, or
other federal farm program areas. It is unlikely that either program crop producers or
other existing beneficiaries of USDA programs would willingly redirect money to a
specialty crop block grant program. While mandatory funding may provide greater
security for long-term funding for specialty crop block grants than discretionary spending
(which must be re-authorized each year), congressional appropriators have and likely
will continue to make cuts in mandatory spending related to agriculture, suggesting that
the stability of mandatory funding may also be less secure in the future. Nevertheless,
the history of agricultural appropriations suggests that mandatory funding would provide
a greater stability of long-term federal funding than discretionary funding.

VI. Summary and Conclusions

There is a lengthy history of devolution of federal policy and programs to the
states through the use of grants-in-aid in general and block grants in particular. In recent
years, the possible consequence of a major devolution of farm policy and programs from
the federal government to the states has received much attention. The U.S. specialty
crop industry has, in general, expressed a desire to devolve specific specialty crop
farm policy area and programs to the states through the use of state block grants.
This is due in part to the perceived success of specialty crop state block grant
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programs that were authorized under the Emergency Agricultural Assistance Act
(EAAC) of 2001 and the Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act (SCCA) of 2004 (PL
108-465) The desire in permanently incorporating specialty crop block grants into
federal farm legislation is receiving support from a number of specialty crop
organizations, their membership, and other stakeholders and has resulted in the
introduction of HR 6193, “The Equitable Agriculture Today for a Healthy American
Act” which would establish a permanent specialty crop state block grant program.
The paper provides a brief history of the use of block grants as a
mechanism for devolution of federal government policy and associated funding to
the states and discussed the advantages and disadvantage of block grants. An
illustrative categorization of specialty crop block grant policies and programs is
developed and each program is discussed relative its impact on achieving longrun sustainability for the U.S. specialty crop industry.
A public finance model is developed from which federal-state cost-share
allocation rules for specialty crop policy programs are derived. Three cost-share
allocations are presented -- federal financing, federal-state financing, and state
financing. Each specialty crop policy program is then assigned one of the three costshare allocations based on the general rule - the greater the spillover benefit from any
given program from a specific state to other states the greater the federal cost share
should be and the less the spillover benefits the less the federal cost share should be.
There is naturally a degree of arbitrariness to the choice of cost-share type assigned to
each specialty crop policy area program. Rationales for the choices are presented and
while it is likely there will not be agreement on cost-share type assigned to each of the
specialty crop policy area program hopefully the framework will stimulate discussion
about the appropriate cost-share allocation and that discussion will center on the
magnitude of direct and spillover benefits of the various specially crop policy programs
that have been presented.
The paper concludes with a discussion on block grant design concepts and
funding issues. The discussion focuses on design concepts that could be used to
eliminate some of the concerns expressed over devolution of federal policy and funding
through the use block grants to the states. These concerns range from state flexibility, to
political manipulation, to continuation of funding. Several types of federal funding of
block grants are discussed and examples of different fair-share allocations are
presented.
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It appears that use of devolution of selected specialty crop policy areas and
programs to the states is a viable tool for giving individual states the flexibility to develop
policies to assist their specialty crop industries in achieving long-run sustainability. It is
incumbent upon the states to select the appropriate policies that will return the largest
benefits for the dollars expended. It will require both state and federal officials to
determine the cost-share that is appropriate for each policy area program that a state
chooses to support with block grant funds. Additionally, careful design and funding of
the specialty crop block grants will be required if the concerns about block grants in
general are to be overcome.
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Appendix A. Public Finance Theory and the Use of Intergovernmental Grants
in a Federal System of Government

This section applies the principles of public finance theory to the problem of the
allocation of agricultural funding between the federal government and the states. This
section applies the relevant economic literature in two areas to determine the role that
block grants could play in financing agricultural programs. First, the problem of
financing public goods is examined, with special emphasis on the problems of
providing public goods in a federal system of government. Second, the use of
intergovernmental grants to finance public goods is examined.
As Breton (p. 177) noted, the problem of financing public goods is not simply a
matter of whether government should provide public goods, but also which unit of
government should do so. Economic goods, he argued, can rarely be classified into
the polar cases of pure private or pure public goods. In particular, Breton noted that a
problem of "imperfect mapping" may arise in which the benefits of a program do not
correspond to the geographic boundaries of a taxing jurisdiction. The problem of
imperfect mapping is particularly important in a federal (i.e., multi-level system of
government).
If the benefits of a good are perfectly mapped, that is, if the benefits of a good
accrue strictly within the boundaries of the unit of government financing the good, then
the government of that jurisdiction will provide the optimal quantity of the good to its
citizens (assuming it has overcome the problem of ascertaining accurately the
preferences of its citizens). On the other hand, if the benefits of the good are
imperfectly mapped, or spill across the jurisdictional boundaries of the financing
government, the investing government is likely to under invest in the good. As a means
of overcoming the imperfect mapping problem, a higher level of government could
provide a subsidy to the lower level unit of government to induce it to invest in the
socially optimal quantity of the good (Breton, pp. 180-82).
Drawing on the welfare economics of Samuelson and the public finance
economics of Breton, Oates examined the problem of underinvestment in public goods
when benefits spill across jurisdictional boundaries. Assuming a world of two goods
and two jurisdictions (the results can be generalized to many goods and jurisdictions),
the optimal allocation for each community in the absence of spillovers can be defined
as:
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(1)

(2)

MRT = MRS1

MRT = MRS2, where

MRT = the marginal rate of transformation between goods X and Y

MRSi = the marginal rate of substitution of community i between good
X (a private good consumed by the citizens of community i)
and good Y (a public good provided by the government of
community i), which is, as Samuelson showed earlier, the sum
of the marginal rates of substitution of all individuals in
community i.

Thus, if there are no losses of benefits across jurisdictional boundaries, each
community will invest in the level of public good Y that is optimal for its citizens. Again,
this assumes the problem of preference revelation has been solved within each
community (i.e., each jurisdiction has solved the problems of determining how much of
the public good is optimal for its citizens and how the cost of the public good should be
shared by its citizens).
If some portion of the benefits of good Y spill across the boundaries of the
communities, such spillovers must be taken into account when determining the socially
optimal level of good Y. The socially optimal level of consumption now becomes:
(3)

MRT = MRS1 + a2*MRS2,

(4)

MRT = MRS2 + a1*MRS1, where:

a1 = the increase in consumption of public good Y that occurs in
community 1 as a result of a one unit increase in the
consumption of Y by community 2;
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a2 = the increase in consumption of public good y that occurs in
community 2 as a result of a one unit increase in the
consumption of Y by community 1, and
0 < a1 a2, < 1.
It is now possible to consider a broad range of spillover combinations and their
implications for public investment decisions:

1. If a1 = a2 = 0, no spillovers will be generated, and each community will
provide the socially optimal quantity of Y for its citizens (i.e., the
outcome is the same as in equations (1) and (2);
2.

If a1 = a2 = 1, the good is a pure Samuelsonian public good and must
be provided by a higher level of government than the two community
governments if an optimal level of investment is to be reached;

3.

If 0 < a1, a2 < 1, there will be spillovers generated between the
communities and, in the absence of a system of compensating
subsidies, the quantity of good Y provided by each jurisdiction will be
less than the socially optimal quantity of Y (Oates, pp. 95-99).

To summarize, underinvestment in a public good may result when some
portion of the benefits of that good accrue to individuals other than the original
investor (where, in this case, the investor is a unit of government). A socially optimal
level of investment can be obtained through the use of government subsidies. In a
federal system of government, a socially optimal level of investment in public goods
that create benefit spillovers across jurisdictional boundaries can be achieved through
a system of intergovernmental subsidies (e.g., from the national government to the
states).
Before considering the use of intergovernmental grants to correct the problem
of underinvestment in public goods, it is necessary to examine the use of other policy
tools to correct the problem. The first alternative is the reapportionment of jurisdictional
boundaries. It is theoretically possible to redefine the boundaries of units of
government in such a way that all benefit spillovers would be internalized to the
decision process and, as a result, a socially optimal level of investment would be
reached (Musgrave and Musgrave, pp. 597-602). Using a spatial model of public
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goods, McMillan demonstrated that an optimal level of investment could be reached
through the use of both grants and reapportionment of jurisdictions. Breton and Scott
(1977) reached a similar result using a transaction cost minimization model.
To rely solely on reapportionment, however, would require a unique set of
boundaries for each good that creates benefit spillovers. This alternative would
require a large number of unique jurisdictions to cover each good that might create
spillovers (Break, 1980a, p. 77). More important, while the existing boundaries of
government may pose problems of imperfect mapping, such boundaries can only be
changed at high political cost (Schultze, p. 185). Thus, while changes in jurisdictional
boundaries are a possible solution to the underinvestment problem, they are unlikely
to succeed if institutional rigidities of the existing jurisdictional boundaries prove
impossible to overcome.
A second possible solution to the underinvestment problem would be the
granting of taxing authority to the investing jurisdiction, thereby permitting it to tax the
recipients of benefit spillovers. Such taxes may either be levied directly on outside
citizens by the investing jurisdiction, or the investing jurisdiction may impose taxes on
the activities of its own firms and citizens which, when the burden is shifted to
outside citizens, compensate the jurisdiction for the spillover benefits it has created
(Musgrave, p.115; Ellickson).
As with reapportionment, however, this option may create a large number of
taxing authorities and raise the transaction costs of collecting the appropriate taxes.
The establishment of taxes, the share of whose burden on outside citizens equals the
share of benefits that spill across jurisdictional boundaries, may be an equally difficult
and costly task. If this cannot be performed at the lower level of government, a
central taxing authority may better serve to correct the underinvestment problem.
Finally, as Stigler (p. 214) observed, a central taxing authority may be necessary
when the taxed parties can escape their tax obligation by migrating beyond the
boundaries of lower level governments.
A final option would simply be the negotiation of appropriate subsidies between
units of government that create and receive benefit spillovers (Coase, pp. 28-42).
While such an approach may succeed when the number of units is small, it becomes
increasingly difficult as the number of units involved in the negotiation process
increases, and thus the transaction costs associated with such negotiations rise
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(Oates, p. 68; Wellisz, p. 361; Regan, p. 436-37; Stigler, 1966, pp. 113-14; Mishan, p.
31; Baumol, 1972, p. 308; Ellickson, pp.97-100). It must also be noted that Pigou
(1946, pp. 183-84) recognized the self-correcting nature of the small-numbers case
and only advocated intervention in those cases where the large number of parties
involved makes it "technically difficult to exact payment.
If none of the options discussed above will succeed in promoting a socially
optimal level of investment in public goods, the use of intergovernmental grants may
be the most feasible option to achieve an optimal level of investment in the spillovergenerating good. The problem remains, however, to design a system of grants that will
encourage an optimal level of investment in the spillover-generating good.
Returning to Oates’ more general solution, a set of subsidies that encourage
an optimal level of investment in the spillover-generating good can be designed
(Oates, pp. 99-104). The optimal conditions for each community were established
earlier as:

(3)

MRT = MRS1 + a2*MRS2,

(4)

MRT = MRS2 + a1 *MRS1.

If a1 and a2 are both non-zero (i.e., there are reciprocal spillovers), then both
governments will receive a subsidy. To find the optimal subsidy for each, a system of
equations must be solved:

(5)

MRT = MRS1 + a2 *MRS2

(6)

MRT = a1 *MRS1 + MRS2,

(7)

MRS1 = MRT – S1

(8)

MRS2 = MRT – S2

MRT = the marginal rate of transformation between private good X and a
spillover-generating public good Y;
MRSi = the marginal rate of substitution between good X and good Y for
jurisdiction i, i = 1, 2
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a1 = the increase in the consumption of good Y that occurs in jurisdiction
1 as a result of the consumption of an additional unit of good
Y by jurisdiction 2 (0 < a, < 1) ;
a2 = the increase in the consumption of good Y that occurs in jurisdiction
2 as a result of the consumption of an additional unit of good
Y by jurisdiction 1 (0 < a„ < 1) ;
S1 = a2*MRS2 the unit subsidy paid to jurisdiction 1, expressed in units
of good X.
S2 = a1*MRS1 the unit subsidy paid to jurisdiction 2, expressed in units
of good X.

Equations 7 and 8 indicate that the outcome of community maximizing behavior
will have each jurisdiction i expend their expenditures on public good Y to the point
where the value placed on the marginal unit (MRSi) is equal to the unit price (MRT –
Si)

The simultaneous solution of equations (2.5) through (2.8) provides the optimal
subsidy for each jurisdiction:

(9)

S1

= (a2* (1 – a1)/ (1 – a1*a2)) * MRT

(10)

S2

= (a1* (1 – a2)/ (1 – a1*a2)) * MRT.

This result suggests some important implications for designing
intergovernmental subsidies. As shown by equation (9), given a1, a larger value for a2
(i.e., a larger share of benefits that spill from 1 into 2) will yield a larger subsidy paid to
jurisdiction 1. Similarly, for a given level of a2 in equation (2.10), a larger value for a1
(i.e., a larger share of benefits that spill from 2 into 1) will yield a larger subsidy paid to
jurisdiction 2. Once again, these results suggest that the grantor would pay a larger
subsidy when a larger share of the benefits spill outside the funding jurisdiction.
Accepting that intergovernmental grants may be necessary to promote an
optimal level of investment in public goods that create benefit spillovers, the question
now turns to what form such grants should take. An analysis of alternative grant forms
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is shown in Figure 1 (Scott, pp. 377-94; Wilde 1968, pp. 340-57 and 1971, pp. 143-55;
Boadway and Wildasin pp. 518-29).
B

Other
Goods

A

Spi llover Good

Figure 1: Comparison of an Unconditional Lump-Sum Grant and a
Conditional Matching Grant
Source:

Boadway and Wildasin, p. 520.

The jurisdiction can be assumed to have an initial budget AA' that is allocated
between the spillover-generating public good and all other goods. The community The
jurisdiction is assumed to allocate its resources between the consumption of a public
good Y that creates benefit spillovers in other jurisdictions and all other goods. It
should be noted that these other goods may be private goods consumed by the
citizens of the jurisdiction or public goods that create no benefits outside the funding
jurisdiction (Waldauer).
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Indifference curve I1 indicates that community welfare is maximized at point E1
and the optimal quantities purchased will be Y1 and X2. Assuming that another unit of
government (either another unit of government at the same level acting directly--as
among two states--or a higher level of government acting on behalf of other lower level
governments--as between the federal government and a state government) provides a
subsidy to the community to compensate it for the benefits that spill across its
boundaries, what form should such a subsidy take?
It may take the form of an unconditional, lump-sum grant. Such a grant has no
restrictions on its use and may be allocated by the recipient for any purpose. Thus,
some of the grant may be allocated to the spill over-generating public good, and some
of it may be allocated to private goods (via a reduction in taxes in the recipient
community) or to public goods that do not create spillovers. Such a grant is shown in
Figure 1 as a shift in the recipient's budget line from AA' to BB'. The recipient's new
allocation, located at point E3 tangent to the community indifference curve I3 will be Y2
of the spillover-generating good and X3 of all other goods.
As an alternative to a lump-sum grant, the grant may take the form of a
conditional matching grant. In this case, the grant will only be received if the recipient
satisfies two conditions. First, the recipient must use the grant for production of the
spillover-generating good. Second, the recipient must match the grant at a specified
rate with its own funds.
Assuming the original slope of the budget line is h and that the matching rate
implies that s is the share of the cost of good Y paid by the grantor, the new budget
line will have a slope of h*(1 - s) and will rotate from AA' to AB'.

The new allocation of

the recipient will be X2 and Y2. If Y2 is the socially optimal level of the public good,
Figure 1 demonstrates that it can be achieved at least cost to the grantor by use of a
conditional matching grant. As shown in Figure 1, the grantor's cost of achieving output
Y2 is DE3 if a lump-sum grant is used, but only DE2 if a matching grant is used. This
result arises because the lump-sum grant produces only an income effect, while the
matching grant reduces the recipient's price of the spillover-generating good, thereby
combining the income effect with a price effect to provide a more powerful incentive for
the recipient to increase its spending on the spillover-generating good. A number of
studies of intergovernmental grant programs have confirmed that recipient jurisdictions
do respond to such price effects and, as a result, the recipient's spending on the
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spillover-generating good is stimulated more by a matching grant than by a lump-sum
grant of equal size (Gramlich, pp. 222-35).
In comparing the cost efficiency of these two types of grants, it should be
reiterated that the choice of grant form is determined by the objective of the grant
program. This choice of objectives has important distributional consequences for both
the grantor and the recipient. While it is true that the recipient would prefer the lumpsum grant (since it would be on the preferred indifference curve I3), it must be
emphasized that the purpose of the grant is not the maximization of the recipient's
welfare. Instead, it is assumed in this analysis that the purpose of the grant is only to
compensate the recipient for spillovers and induce the socially optimal level of
investment in the public good at the minimum cost to the grantor. This objective can be
accomplished at least cost with a matching grant.
If a conditional matching grant is to be used to finance a spillover-generating
good, the problem of financing such a good now becomes the determination of the
appropriate subsidy to be paid by the higher level government to the recipient
government (i.e., the determination of the s in the h*[1 - s] budget line slope in Figure
1). A model of intergovernmental grants developed by Harford (pp. 99-103) provides a
subsidy from each of two higher levels of government (state and national) to a local
government that optimizes the quantity of the spillover-generating public good provided
by the local government. Although this model introduces the additional complication of
two higher levels of government rather than one, it permits some conclusions to be
drawn about the optimal shares of the cost of the spillover-generating good that should
be paid by the higher levels of government. These shares can then be translated into
the optimal matching rates that can be used to finance the spillover-generating good
through a conditional matching grant. For a joint state-federal program, the Harford
model consists of two equations:

(11) N1 = a1*B(Y) - (1 - s1) *C(Y)
(12) N2 = B (Y) - C (Y), where:
N1 = The state net benefit equation;
N2 = The national net benefit equation;
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a1 = The share of the benefits of public good Y retained by the state
jurisdiction;
S1 = The share of the cost of public good Y paid by
the national government;
B(Y) = The benefit function for public good Y;
C(Y) = The cost function for public good Y;
0 < a1 < 1; and
0 < s1 < 1.
The necessary conditions for achieving a socially optimal level of investment in
Y are reached by equalizing the marginal cost and marginal benefit that accrues
within each level of government. Differentiating equations (11) and (12) and setting
them equal to zero yields the optimal conditions for each level of government:
(13) a1*dB/dY =(1 – s1) *dC/dY
(14) dB/dY = dC/dY, where:
dB/dY = The marginal benefit of public good Y;
dC/dY = The marginal cost of public good Y.
Solving equations (15) and (16) simultaneously yields the optimal share of the
cost of good Y paid by the national government:

(15) s1 = 1 – a1.

The results correspond to those discussed in earlier literature (e.g., Oates).
Namely, Equation (17) shows that the federal government will compensate the state
government for the share of the total benefits that spill across state boundaries.
This cost share can now be converted a matching rates that, if used to
establish an open-ended conditional matching grant, will yield an optimal level of state
investment in the spillover-generating good. The matching rate can be calculated as:

(16)

m1 = (1 – s1)/s1
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Thus, if the federal government grants m1 dollars to the state government for
each dollar the state government invests in the spillover-generating good, a socially
optimal level of the good will be provided by the state government. Before examining
the range of agricultural programs which might be financed through a system of
intergovernmental grants, a summary of this section is in order. The provision of
public goods is an especially difficult problem when decisions are made within a
federal (i.e., multi-level) system of government. When a publicly-provided good yields
benefits to residents outside the funding jurisdiction, the jurisdiction providing the
good will not have an incentive to provide a socially optimal level of the good. The
producing jurisdiction can be given an incentive to provide the socially optimal
quantity of the good by providing it a subsidy equal to the difference between the
marginal social benefit obtained from the good (including that portion which accrues
to outside residents) and the marginal benefit retained by the funding jurisdiction.
In a federal system of government, such a subsidy is typically provided by a
higher level government to compensate lower levels of government for the external
benefits generated by these lower level jurisdictions. The lowest cost form of such a
subsidy is an open-ended matching grant (i.e., a grant of m dollars from the higher
level of government for each dollar spent by the lower level government on the
spillover generating good). The matching rate must be established to equate the
share of the marginal cost of the good paid by the higher level of government with
the share of the marginal benefits of the good that accrue to persons outside the
lower level of government. If benefit spillovers are pervasive in agricultural programs,
matching grants are clearly an appropriate means through which to finance
agricultural programs in the United States.
With this result in mind, equation (19) can shed some light on the matching rate
at which the federal government should finance programs at the state level. For the
share of benefits retained by the state (s1) in equation (19), the national matching rate
would be:
1.

In those cases where the entire benefit of program is retained
within the state (s1 = 1), the federal matching rate on state
spending would equal 0 (i.e., the federal government would not
match state spending).

2.

In those cases the entire benefit of the program spills outside the
state (s1 = 0), the federal government will finance the entire cost
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of the program (i.e., the program would operate at the federal
level).
3.

In those cases where a portion of the benefits of the program spill
outside the state (0 < s1 < 1), the federal government will match
state spending at a level where the matching rate reflects the
spillover rate of the program.

Thus, the application of these public finance models to the problem of financing
agricultural programs can provide some guidance in considering the policy alternatives
in the devolution of agricultural programs from the federal government states.

As

discussed in detail in the next section, the type of agricultural program in question may
determine the expected spillovers from such programs and, therefore, the funding
mechanism that would be best suited for financing such programs.
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